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RES JUDICATA EFFECTS OF UNAPPEALED,
INDEPENDENTLY SUFFICIENT ALTERNATIVE
DETERMINATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Adopting the reasoning of the Second Circuit decision in Hal-
pern v. Schwartz, I the Restatement (Second) of Judgments advocates a
blanket exception to resjudicata for unappealed, independently suf-
ficient alternative determinations. 2 The Second Restatement position
reflects three arguments against preclusion raised in Halpern:3 first,
parties may lack the incentive or opportunity fully to litigate alterna-
tive determinations; second, a court that relies more heavily on one
ground may not adequately reason the alternative ground; and
third, res judicata treatment of alternative determinations may fos-
ter cautionary appeals by parties fearing future litigation.4 The Sec-
ond Restatement also argues that alternative determinations, like
nonessential determinations, are not necessary to the result and,
therefore, do not merit res judicata treatment.5 The Second Restate-
ment contends that considerations of "predictability and simplicity"
justify its uniform treatment of unappealed, independently sufficient
determinations. 6
The Second Restatement's uniform and mechanical exception to
res judicata is objectionable because alternative determinations do
not automatically trigger the concerns recognized in Halpern.7 Fur-
thermore, the rule that a determination must be essential for collat-
eral estoppel to apply should not disqualify alternative
determinations; the Second Restatement implies too narrow a defini-
tion of "essential" to so restrict the doctrine.8 The First Restatement's
position, giving full res judicata effect to unappealed, independently
sufficient alternative determinations, 9 coupled with discretionary ex-
ceptions triggered by the presence of the considerations outlined in
Halpern, better protects the interests of the litigants and the
1 426 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1970). For a discussion of Halpern, see infra notes 27-40
and accompanying text.
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 comment i (1980).
3 See id. § 20 reporter's note; Halpern, 426 F.2d at 105-06.
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment i.
5 See id.
6 Id.
7 See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
9 See RESTATEMENT OFJUDGMENTS § 68 comment n (1942).
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courts.10 Under this approach, therefore, a court should give res
judicata effect to an alternative determination unless the dangers of
incomplete litigation, inadequate reasoning, or purely speculative
appeals require otherwise. A general rule of resjudicata for alterna-
tive determinations, with discretionary exceptions, would encourage
resolution in the first action by requiring a losing party who chose
not to appeal to raise substantive fairness considerations in the sec-
ond action or face preclusion.
I
BACKGROUND: THE RES JUDICATA DOCTRINE
The doctrine of res judicata binds litigants and their privies to
prior valid and final judgments rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction."I "The sum and substance of the whole rule is that a
matter once judicially decided is finally decided."1 2 Because res
judicata allows a litigant only one opportunity to litigate an issue, 13
a party must rely on an appeal, not relitigation, to correct errors in
the first judgment. 14
The doctrine protects a broad spectrum of interrelated inter-
ests.1 5 The Supreme Court has identified the role res judicata plays
in protecting litigants from unwarranted litigation and promoting
judicial economy.1 6 Res judicata protects both the courts and indi-
viduals from the burdens of repetitive litigation. 17 Resjudicata fos-
ters repose' 8 by settling issues between litigants and creating
10 See infra notes 52-82, 108-10 and accompanying text.
11 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1174 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). "[T]he broad 'res judicata'
phrase refers to the distinctive effects of a judgment separately characterized as 'claim
preclusion' and 'issue preclusion.'" 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4402, at 6 (1981).
12 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 1174.
13 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328 (1979). Modernization of pro-
cedural rules in federal and many state jurisdictions greatly expanded the role of res
judicata. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 678-79 (1983). Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, for example, joinder of claims, joinder of parties, liberalized plead-
ing and amendment rules, and broad discovery opportunities "ha[ve] made inevitable
the narrowing of the situations in which a second opportunity to litigate need be given."
Id. at 679.
14 Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 325 (1927).
15 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 11, § 4403, at 11.
16 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (both direct
and collateral estoppel protect litigants and courts from burdensome suits); Blonder-
Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971) (relitigation
of issues diverts resources from alternative uses).
17 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 11, § 4403, at 17. "[C]ourts
have repeatedly recognized that res judicata is not defeated by error in the initial judg-
ment." Id. However, error may be a factor in limiting the preclusive effect of a judg-
ment. Id. at 18.
18 Id. at 15.
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"certainty in legal relations."' 9 In addition, the consistency be-
tween resolutions promoted by res judicata furthers respect for the
law and protects individuals from contrary results. 20
Courts possess some discretion to decide whether res judicata
precludes a particular action.21 The danger of perpetuating an erro-
neous determination in subsequent litigation, the spectre of unfair-
ness, and the increased incentive for parties to protract litigation
militate against strict application of the doctrine. Generally, the Sec-
ond Restatement grants a discretionary exception to res judicata when
a party, because of "special circumstances, did not have an adequate
opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the
initial action."' 22 The special circumstances enumerated by the Sec-
ond Restatement that would qualify as grounds for an exception to res
judicata include unavailability of appeal, inability to litigate com-
pletely in the prior action, substantial differences between the initial
and subsequent claims or the "legal context" in which they arise,
differences in the burden of persuasion between the two actions,
and inability of a party to foresee sufficiently the initial action's role
in subsequent litigation. 23
The Second Restatement advocates a nondiscretionary exception
to res judicata when a party loses an issue on the basis of unap-
pealed, independently sufficient alternative determinations. 24 If A
19 Commissioner v. Sunner, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
20 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 11, § 4403, at 12-13; Hazard,
Res Nova in ResJudicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1036, 1042 (1971).
21 See, e.g., Moch v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 548 F.2d 495, 598 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
We are unwilling to hold. . . that [resjudicata] constitute[s] an absolute
from which we must never stray, even when a mechanical application
would result in manifest injustice. Rather, we believe that the occasional
adoption of an exception to the finality rule when public policy so de-
mands does not undermine its general effectiveness.
Id.
When a party lacks either incentive or full and fair opportunity to litigate in a prior
action, the Supreme Court recognizes exceptions to res judicata to promote fairness.
See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-81 (1982); Allen v. Mc-
Curry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 (1979).
The Court also warns against use of res judicata when it would encourage increased
litigation. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 329-30. One district court refused to give
offensive collateral estoppel effect to a consent decree because the application would
eliminate the incentive to end litigation. In re Cenco Inc. Sec. Litig., 529 F. Supp. 411,
415-16 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 comment e
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) as reason for according special treatment to consent decrees).
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28(5)(c) (1980).
23 Id. § 28.
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment i, discusses unappealed,
independently sufficient alternative determinations in the context of issue preclusion.
Section 20 comment e covers alternative determinations in the context of claim preclu-
sion. A prior judgment does not bar a subsequent action on the same claim when one of
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sues B to recover interest due on a note, and the court determines
that A used fraud to induce B to execute the note and also executed
a binding release of the obligation to pay interest, then judgment is
for B. 25 The alternative determinations of fraud and release sepa-
rately support the judgment. In a later action, if A sues B upon ma-
turity for the principal and B, relying on the prior determination of
fraud as res judicata, defends with a motion for summary judgment,
under the Second Restatement the court should deny B's motion 26 be-
cause the prior determination of fraud is not a conclusive determi-
nation, standing alone, in the second suit.
II
RATIONALES FOR A RULE OF NONPRECLUSION FOR
ALTERNATIVE DETERMINATIONS
A. The Substantive Considerations of Halpern v. Schwartz
The Second Circuit's opinion in Halpern v. Schwartz27 provided
the rationales underlying the Second Restatement's rule of nonpreclu-
sion for unappealed, independently sufficient alternative determina-
tions. 28 In the first action Halpern and her husband lost an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding brought by their creditors.2 9
The court concluded that an assignment of property by Halpern and
her husband to their son constituted an "act of bankruptcy" on
three alternative statutory grounds. 30 Of the three alternative deter-
minations, only one required a finding that the Halperns acted
"with intent to hinder and delay creditors." 3 1 An appellate court
affirmed without opinion. 32 In the second action, Halpern sought
discharge in bankruptcy. In a motion for summary judgment deny-
ing discharge, the trustee, Schwartz, argued that a bankrupt who in-
the prior alternative determinations, standing alone, would not bar a subsequent action.
Id. § 20 comment 3.
25 See id. § 27 comment i, illustration 15.
26 Id.
27 426 F.2d 102 (1970).
28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 20 reporter's note (1980).
29 426 F.2d at 103. The pertinent statute was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L.
No. 55-171, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
30 426 F.2d at 103. The court made the following determinations concerning the
transfer: "[One,] it was a removal of property with intent to hinder and delay creditors
under section 3a(1) of the [Bankruptcy] Act [11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(1) (1968)]; [two,] it was a
transfer of property under section 3a(l), fraudulent as to creditors [see 11 U.S.C.
§ 107(d)(2) (1968)] . . .; and [three] it was a preferential transfer of property under
section 3(a)(2)." Id.
31 Id.
32 In re Halpern, Nos. 29704-05 (2d Cir. June 10, 1965). The Second Restatement
does not discuss alternative determinations affirmed without opinion, but apparently
treats them like unappealed decisions because it expressly adopts the reasoning of
Halpern.
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tentionally attempted to frustrate creditors by secreting property
was statutorily ineligible for discharge. 33 The trustee argued that
the third alternative determination in the initial action conclusively
proved that Halpern and her husband intentionally had attempted
to delay the creditors; thus, res judicata governed and barred Hal-
pern's second action.3 4
The court rejected the trustee's argument, concluding that a
judgment resting on three independently sufficient grounds did not
necessarily bar a subsequent action implicating only one separate
ground.35 The Halpern court considered alternative determinations
suspect for two reasons. First, a court might make an alternative
determination using incomplete analysis, "confiden[t] that nothing
turned on the decision."' 36 Second, alternative determinations
might inhibit a party from appealing the judgment of the initial ac-
tion. A party, perceiving as insurmountable one of several findings,
has no incentive to appeal from an adverse judgment that also rests
on weaker alternative grounds.3 7 Even if the losing party did ap-
peal, the alternative determinations might not be fairly litigated; the
appellee's argument might be based on only the strongest alterna-
tive determination, or the appellant might argue that the judgment
should be reversed without specifically referring to each of the alter-
native determinations. 38 The Halpern court considered the likeli-
hood of perpetuating error through inadequate review or
incomplete adversarial process too strong to treat the determination
of intent as res judicata.39
The Halpern court also raised an efficiency argument for deny-
ing preclusive effect to independently sufficient alternative determi-
nations. Res judicata "would, in effect, require cautionary appeals
litigating issues on appeal for their possible effect on future indeter-
minate collateral litigation, which neither party can be sure will oc-
cur. The rule at best would preclude some future trial litigation at
the expense of currently creating extra appellate litigation." 40
33 426 F.2d at 103-04.
34 Id. at 104.
35 Id. at 105. The court refused to follow the position of the RESTATEMENT OFJUDG-
MENTs § 68 comment n (1942) (advocating preclusion for unappealed, independently
sufficient alternative determinations). See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
36 426 F.2d 102, 105 (footnote omitted).
37 Id. at 106.
38 Id. For example, in the first action Halpern neglected to argue on appeal lack of
intent, arguing instead that there had been no assignment of property. Id.
39 Id. at 107.
40 Id. at 106. The court noted that it would be particularly onerous to require fi-
nancially-strapped debtors like Halpern to avoid res judicata in future discharge pro-
ceedings by appealing bankruptcy adjudications that an appellate court might simply
affirm on an alternative ground. Id.
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B. The "Nonessential" Nature of Alternative Determinations
In addition to the considerations raised by Halpern, the Second
Restatement argues that a res judicata exception for alternative deter-
minations is consistent with the requirement of issue preclusion that
only determinations "essential" to the judgment have res judicata
effect.4 I The Second Restatement states that "[t]here are. . . persua-
sive reasons for analogizing the case [of the alternative determina-
tions] to that of the nonessential determination. ' '42 Nonessential
determinations are not "necessary to the result, and in that sense
[they have] some of the characteristics of dicta."'43 The Second Re-
statement does not explicitly categorize alternative determinations as
"nonessential" 44 but does depart from the First Restatement's posi-
tion.45 Therefore, insofar as the Second Restatement considers alterna-
tive determinations "nonessential," the general rule limiting issue
preclusion to essential determinations mandates the exception to
res judicata.
III
CRITICISMS OF THE SECOND RESTATEMENT EXCEPTION
A. The Substantive Worth of the Prior Decision
The Second Restatement drafters chose to apply their rule denying
preclusive effect to unappealed, independently sufficient alternative
determinations in all cases. 46 Although the drafters acknowledged
that in some cases the prior action is so vigorously contested that
the Halpern concerns are absent,47 they favored a uniform rule "in
the interest of predictability and simplicity. ' 48 When courts apply
the Second Restatement approach to cases lacking the Halpern con-
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment i (1980); see also Malloy v.
Trombley, 50 N.Y.2d 46, 56-58, 405 N.E.2d 213, 219-20, 427 N.Y.S.2d 969, 975-76
(1980) (Mayer,J., dissenting) (alternative determinations fall outside meaning of "essen-
tial"). The requirement that a determination be essential to the prior judgment is found
in the Second Restatement's general rules of issue preclusion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment i (1980).
43 Id. § 20 comment e. For purposes of claim preclusion the Second Restatement re-
gards alternative determinations as nonessential when other determinations would not
bar a second suit. Id. See also supra note 24.
44 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 comments h, i,j (1980) (ambigu-
ously positioning alternative determinations in separate comment between comments
regarding "essential" and "non-essential" determinations).
45 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 comment n (1942); infra notes 90-92 and
accompanying text.
46 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment i (1980) ("There may be
cases where, despite these considerations, the balance tips in favor of preclusion because
of the fullness with which the issue was litigated and decided in the first action.").
48 Id.
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cerns, therefore, they ignore the substantive worth of the prior adju-
dication 49 and contradict the res judicata goal of encouraging full
and fair litigation. 50 On the other hand, inconsistent application of
nonpreclusion exceptions would be unfair to parties relying on the
Second Restatement's general rule.51 Thus, the problem with the Sec-
ond Restatement approach stems from the nonpreclusion rule itself,
not from an unwillingness to deviate from that rule.
In Malloy v. Trombley52 the New York Court of Appeals rejected
mechanical application of the Second Restatement's nonpreclusion
rule. The court examined a prior judgment in the New York Court
of Claims resting on alternative grounds to see if it would be unfair
to the losing party to apply res judicata in a second action.53 The
court applied issue preclusion against Malloy who had lost in the
first action. The court of appeals did not "inten[d] to enunciate any
broad rule" 54 for alternative determinations, but noted that blanket
application of a res judicata exception disregarded the substantive
worth of the prior judgment.55 The Malloy court rejected the Second
Restatement's approach, instead favoring res judicata for alternative
determinations where the concerns raised in Halpern did not exist.
The litigation in Malloy resulted from an automobile collision
involving Malloy, Trombley, and a police officer. 56 Malloy and
Trombley sued each other in New York Supreme Court for injuries
and at the same time brought individual actions against the state in
the New York Court of Claims.57 The court of claims tried the ac-
tions against the state jointly and held that each plaintiff had failed
to prove negligence of the police officer.58 The court, "aware of the
49 See infra note 55 and accompanying text; infra notes 75-80 and accompanying
text.
50 See F.JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2 (2d ed. 1977) ("it is the aim
of a system of procedure to permit full development of the contentions and evidentiary
possibilities of the various parties with the aim of deciding the case upon the merits").
51 See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text. The criticism here focuses on the
adoption of a general exception, not the uniform application of that exception. Because
a general exception to res judicata for alternative determinations would, itself, diminish
the incentive to appeal, it would be unfair to deny that exception to a party who had
relied on the general rule. The losing party could rightly complain that he lacked full
incentive to litigate in the first action and full opportunity to do so in the second. See
supra text accompanying note 22. Having chosen nonpreclusion as a general rule, uni-
form application was the only fair option. This may explain what the reporters meant by
"predictability and simplicity." See supra text accompanying notes 46-48. This Note,
however, criticizes the initial choice of a nonpreclusion general rule as unnecessary.
52 50 N.Y.2d 46, 405 N.E.2d 213, 427 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1980).
5S Id. at 50, 405 N.E.2d at 215, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 971-72.
54 Id. at 52, 405 N.E.2d at 216, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
55 Id. at 59, 405 N.E.2d at 214, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
56 Id. at 48, 405 N.E.2d at 214, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 49, 405 N.E.2d at 214, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
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pending Supreme Court"59 actions, also found both Trombley and
Malloy contributorily negligent. Neither party appealed. 60
Thereafter, Trombley, the defendant in Malloy's supreme court
suit, moved for summary judgment on the ground that the prior de-
termination of Malloy's contributory negligence collaterally es-
topped that issue's relitigation.6 1 The trial judge denied Trombley's
motion but was reversed by the appellate division. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the appellate division, ruling that it would not be un-
fair to preclude Malloy's claim. The court of appeals reached this
result even though the court of claim's determination that the police
officer was not negligent was independently sufficient to support the
judgment in that first case.6 2
In Malloy the Court of Appeals found unwarranted the Second
Restatement's concern that the prior court may not have reached the
alternative determinations with adequate care.6 3 The court of
claims, knowing that litigation in the pending supreme court actions
might "turn" on its findings, had carefully considered the issue of
Malloy's contributory negligence. Furthermore, the parties in the
first action had fully litigated this issue.64 Malloy did not argue that
the existence of independently sufficient alternative holdings had
dissuaded him from appealing the first court's determination that he
had been contributorily negligent.6 5 The Court of Appeals also dis-
puted the Second Restatement's efficiency argument,66 contending that
"an appeal would be less time consuming and at a less beleagured
level of our court system than would be true in consequence of [a]
new trial."67
Although the New York Court of Appeals refused to state a
general rule for the res judicata effects of independently sufficient
alternative determinations,68 it rejected a blanket application of the
Second Restatement's approach. The court's evaluation of Malloy's op-
portunity to litigate his assertion that he was not contributorily neg-
ligent, and of the adequacy of appellate review, demonstrate the
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 50, 405 N.E.2d at 214, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 972. "The care and attention de-
voted to the issue by [the trial judge] in this instance saps such a contention of any
vitality." Id.
64 Id., 405 N.E.2d at 214, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
65 Id. at 51, 405 N.E.2d at 215-16, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
66 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 comment i (1980) ("If [the losing
party] were to appeal solely for the purpose of avoiding. . . issue preclusion, then the
rule might be responsible for increasing the burdens of. . . courts .... ").
67 Malloy, 50 N.Y.2d at 51-52, 405 N.E.2d at 216, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
68 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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court's recognition that the prior decision had substantive worth.
The court's detailed opinion attempted to both guarantee fairness
to the plaintiff, Malloy, and, at the same time, free the lower courts
from entertaining unnecessary litigation.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Goblirsch v. Western
Land Roller Co. 69 also supports the view that mechanical application
of a res judicata exception for alternative determinations unnecessa-
rily ignores the substantive worth of the prior decision. The plaintiff
in Goblirsch sued the Western Land Roller Co. after injuring his hand
at work in a grinding machine the company manufactured. 70 Gob-
lirsch lost the case; the jury submitted a special verdict including
findings that the manufacturer was not negligent and not strictly lia-
ble and that Goblirsch had assumed the risk of his injury.71 Gob-
lirsch then initiated a suit against his employers.72 The defendants
moved for summary judgment, arguing that "the jury's special ver-
dict in the [prior case] that [Goblirsch] assumed the risk of injury
from the grinde[r]" collaterally estopped him from relitigating his
claim for damages.73 The trial judge agreed and decided the case in
the employers' favor. The Minnesota Supreme Court consolidated
Goblirsch's appeals from these separate decisions.74
A holding of nonpreclusion in Goblirsch would have ignored the
value of the first court's opinion in a case lacking many of the Hal-
pern considerations. The Goblirsch case, for example, lacked the Hal-
pern concern that a judge might rely too heavily on one
independently sufficient determination and consequently decide an-
other without adequate care.75 In Goblirsch the alternative determi-
nations in the first action were by jury special verdict, rather than by
a judge.76 The Minnesota rule controlling jury special verdicts spe-
cifically prohibits either the court or counsel from "inform[ing] the
jury of the effect of its answers on the outcome of the case." 77 A
jury is, therefore, less likely than a judge to consider one factual
69 310 Minn. 471, 246 N.W.2d 687 (1976). This decision appeared prior to publi-
cation of the Second Restatement but subsequent to the Halpern decision.
70 Id. at 473, 246 N.W.2d at 689.
71 Id. at 472-73, 246 N.W.2d at 688.
72 Id. at 473, 246 N.W.2d at 689.
73 Id. at 477, 246 N.W.2d at 691.
74 Id. at 472, 246 N.W.2d at 688.
75 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
76 Special verdicts generally require that a jury make specific findings on each fac-
tual issue relevant in a case. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 2508 (1971) ("better practice is to simplify the questions by confining each to
a single issue").
77 MINN. R. Civ. P. 49.01. An exception in the rule, permitting the judge to inform
the jury that findings on corporate negligence may affect a party's recovery, was not
relevant to Goblirsch.
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determination less carefully because of the presumed legal effect of
another.
Lack of an incentive to litigate at trial or on appeal is another
factor missing in Goblirsch. Goblirsch sued the "deep pocket" manu-
facturer in his first action and lost. He then appealed the decision,
indicating that the alternative grounds for the first decision did not
dissuade him from full litigation. 78 Goblirsch's failure to challenge
on appeal the first court's finding that he had assumed the risk of his
injury does not raise the Halpern concern that the litigants could
overlook an alternative determination. Goblirsch predicated his ap-
peal on assertions that the trial judge gave erroneous instructions
and that the jury was improperly influenced. 79 These allegations,
even if true, would not win a reversal if they were harmless. Gob-
lirsch had to argue further that there was insufficient "credible evi-
dence to support the jury's verdict on the liability issues." 80 Thus,
his appeal necessarily raised the assumption of risk issue. Further-
more, Western Land Roller Co. would not have overlooked its de-
fense of assumption of risk. The first court's finding on this issue,
therefore, could not have suffered from inadequate litigation by
either party.
The efficiency considerations raised in Halpern also favor res
judicata in Goblirsch. The Goblirsch jury did not find the plaintiff neg-
ligent,8 1 so he was not forced into a cautionary appeal to protect
against future collateral litigation. A res judicata exception, how-
ever, would have rewarded Goblirsch for not joining his employers
in the first suit by allowing him to relitigate a liability issue he had
already lost. The tactic of shifting adversaries to relitigate before a
new jury is undesirable.82 Nonpreclusion in Goblirsch, therefore,
would have been an unnecessary waste of judicial resources.
78 Although Goblirsch appealed the first judgment, the appeal had not been de-
cided at the time of the second judgment. In such a situation, the first judgment is
considered final for purposes of res judicata. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 27 comment o; infra note 87 and accompanying text.
79 Goblirsch argued on appeal that remarks by a spectator had unfairly influenced
the jury and that the trial judge erred by not instructing thejury on theories of breach of
express and implied warranty. Goblirsch, 310 Minn. at 473, 246 N.W.2d at 689.
80 Id. at 474, 246 N.W.2d at 689.
81 Id. at 472-73, 246 N.W.2d at 688.
82 See Lucas, The Direct and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Alternative Holdings, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 701, 721-22 (1983) (tactic of shifting adversaries "just the sort of case that gave
impetus to the abandonment of the mutuality requirement"). In Blonder-Tongue Labs.,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), the Supreme Court criticized the
requirement of mutuality of estoppel:
Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of
unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming ta-
ble or "a lack of discipline and disinterestedness on the part of the lower
courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure."
Id. at 329 (citing Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952)). This
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B. The Definition of "Essential" for Purposes of Collateral
Estoppel
The Second Restatement's requirement that a determination be
"essential" in a prior action to be used for collateral estoppel83
should not disqualify independently sufficient alternative determina-
tions. Although an alternative determination is in one sense nones-
sential because the judgment could stand without it, several
authorities reject such a strict definition. 84 These authorities agree
that a determination is "essential" if it is not immaterial or inciden-
tal to the judgment. 85
The Second Restatement's refusal to consider alternative determi-
nations "essential" because they are not strictly necessary to the re-
sult is erroneous. The drafters' comparison of alternative
determinations to "mere dictum" fails because, among other rea-
sons, alternative determinations are reviewable on appeal, whereas
nonessential ones are not.8 6 Furthermore, such a strict construction
of "essential" is inconsistent with other sections of the Second Re-
statement. For example, section 27, comment o of the Second Restate-
ment gives collateral estoppel effect to alternative determinations
that are affirmed on appeal.8 7 Similarly, section 27, illustration 16,
objection would apply equally well to Goblirsch had the Minnesota Supreme Court ap-
plied an exception to res judicata for alternative determinations.
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 (1980).
84 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 comment o (1942) (A finding of facts not
essential to judgment "is to be distinguished from. . .[the situation] where both issues
are found [in the alternative] for the defendant, in which case each finding is as material
as the other."); J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.443[4] (2d ed. 1984) (determinations, each independently adequate to support judg-
ment, nevertheless are conclusive) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]; Lucas, supra note 82, at
703 (recognizing "surface analogy between. . . independently sufficient determinations
and those that are not essential to the judgment" but pointing out substantive
differences).
85 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OFJUDGMENTS § 68 comment o (1942) ("[w]here the jury
or the court makes findings of fact but the judgment is not dependent upon these find-
ings, they are not conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action based upon a
different cause of action."); MOORE, supra note 84, 0.443 (5.-) (2d ed. 1984) ("[Ain
incidental or collateral determination of an issue that was not material in the prior action
does not foreclose reconsideration of that issue in later litigation in which the issue is
material."); Lucas, supra note 82, at 701 ("[A] determination that does not logically sup-
port the judgment is not essential and may be relitigated in a subsequent suit on a differ-
ent cause of action.").
86 MOORE, supra note 84, 0.443(5.-2): "[Each alternative determination] supports
the judgment and is made against the losing party, so all may be reviewed on appeal.
Thus the most important reason assigned for not extending the effect of estoppel to
findings that do not support the judgment is wanting." See also Lucas, supra note 82, at
703 (noting that reviewability by appeal distinguishes alternative determinations from
nonessential determinations).
87 "If thejudgment. ..was based on a determination of two issues, either of which
standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, and the appellate court
upholds both of these determinations as sufficient, and accordingly affirms the judg-
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advocates preclusive effect for alternative determinations that, taken
together, "necessarily adjudicated the issue."88 According to this
illustration, if a plaintiff sues to recover interest on a note, and the
defendant wins on the alternative grounds of fraud and release of
the obligation to pay interest, then the plaintiff can be collaterally
estopped from suing on a subsequent installment.8 9 The Second Re-
statement reaches this result although neither the determination of
fraud nor release alone is "essential" in the sense that the judgment
in the first action could not have been reached without it.
IV
A RES JUDICATA RULE FOR ALTERNATIVE DETERMINATIONS
A. The General Rule
The 1942 Restatement ofJudgments gave res judicata effect to un-
appealed, independently sufficient alternative determinations. 90
This general rule acknowledges the substantive worth of the prior
adjudication. The First Restatement reasons that where a judgment is
based on alternative determinations it "is not based on one of the
issues more than the other;. . . either. . . both are material to the
judgment or. . . neither is material. It seems obvious that it should
not be held that neither is material, and hence both should be held
to be material." 91 The First Restatement also distinguishes alternative
grounds from "mere dictum," giving them the same deference for
res judicata purposes that they would enjoy for stare decisis pur-
poses. 92 A general rule of preclusion for alternative determinations
recognizes the substantive worth of the prior decision and is more
consistent with the policies of res judicata than a rule of
nonpreclusion.
Some courts and commentators support res judicata for alter-
native determinations.9 3 Even "[t]he Second Circuit has twice re-
ment, the judgment is conclusive as to both determinations." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment o (1980).
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, illustration 16 (1980).
89 Id. In this situation the defendant asserts all alternative determinations, as dis-
tinguished from the case in which only one ground is asserted as conclusive. Cf. supra
text accompanying notes 24-26.
90 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
91 Id. § 68 comment n. According to the First Restatement, determinations material
to the judgment qualify as "essential determinations." See id.
92 Id. "The distinction as to the application of the doctrine ofresjudicata [for alter-
native determinations] is not unlike the distinction [in the doctrine of stare decisis] be-
tween alternative grounds for a decision and mere dictum." Id.
93 See MOORE, supra note 84, 0.443[5.-2], at 791 (endorsing the First Restatement
position and stating "[N]o other court of appeals has adopted [the Halpern] position
without qualification.") (footnote omitted); see also Lucas, supra note 82 (favoring general
rule of res judicata for alternative determinations).
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jected the Halpern formulation as a general governing rule. . .. "94
In Williams v. Ward95 "the plaintiff was pursuing the two actions si-
multaneously and thus could fully anticipate the potential barring
effect of the earlier judgment in deciding not to appeal .... "96
Refusing to apply Halpern, the Williams court noted that the Halpern
court had limited its decision to the facts before it, and also that
Halpern's substantive and efficiency considerations did not exist in
the case at bar.97 In Winters v. Lavine98 the Second Circuit again re-
fused to extend Halpern beyond bankruptcy proceedings. 99 The
court stated that Halpern is an exception to "the traditional proposi-
tion that an alternative ground upon which a decision is based
should be regarded as 'necessary' for purposes of . . . res judi-
cata."' 00 Thus, some authority since the Second Restatement favors as
a general rule res judicata for alternative determinations.
A general rule of preclusion for independently sufficient deter-
minations more satisfactorily handles situations where the Halpern
considerations of adequate reasoning and litigating are unconvinc-
ing. The mere existence of alternative grounds does not mean that
the factfinder or parties will overlook a determination. For example,
a party must separately plead, and the court separately pass upon,
an affirmative defense;' 0 ' therefore, it receives individual attention.
In cases like Malloy and Goblirsch the alternative grounds are clearly
distinct. The situation in Halpern is not necessarily typical. 10 2
Efficiency considerations may also favor res judicta treatment
for alternative determinations. As the Malloy court noted, the ad-
vantages of relitigation foreclosure may well outweigh the disadvan-
tages of cautionary appeals.' 03 Furthermore, Goblirsch is illustrative
of situations in which a nonpreclusion rule would encourage reliti-
gation rather than appeal, 10 4 contrary to the goals of resjudicata. 10 5
The Second Restatement position encourages a losing plaintiff like
94 See MOORE, supra note 84, 0.443[5.-2], at 791 (footnote omitted).
95 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir. 1977).
96 Id. at 1154.
97 Id.
98 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978).
99 Id. at 67.
100 Id.
101 See MOORE, supra note 84, 0.443[5.-2], at 792.
102 Moore states that Halpern was unusual because the three alleged grounds of
bankruptcy were not clearly distinct. Id. at 792 n.7. Moore contrasts the Second Restate-
ment's own example, see supra text accompanying notes 24-26, in which the alternative
grounds are fraud and release: "Fraud is an affirmative defense, and must be pleaded
with particularity, and neither the court nor the parties could possibly pass over it
lightly." MOORE, supra note 84, 0.443[5.-2], at 792 (footnote omitted).
103 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
105 See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
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Goblirsch not to appeal the issues decided alternatively against him
where the ground he needs to relitigate in the second action appears
unlikely to be reversed in the first.10 6 He is better off suing other
defendants. Thus,
[u]nder the Restatement (Second) formulation . . . the plaintiff
would be permitted to relitigate the common element or defense
against any number of blameless defendants so long as he contin-
ued to lose on both issues. Such a rule would plainly discourage
joinder of defendants, which ought to be encouraged, and en-
courage dogged pursuit of a hopeless claim, which ought to be
discouraged. 107
Therefore, considerations of efficiency, as well as full litigation, can
run in favor of, rather than against, res judicata for alternative
determinations.
B. Discretionary Exceptions Handling the Halpern Concerns
The Second Restatement allows exceptions to res judicata on a dis-
cretionary basis if a party can show a "clear and convincing need for
a new determination of the issue"'108 because of "[in]adequate op-
portunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the
initial action." 10 9 Thus, where the Halpern considerations of ade-
quate reasoning and full litigation in the prior actions pertain, a
party may escape a general rule of preclusion for alternative deter-
minations. Where valid grounds exist for relitigation a party would
be free to argue that resjudicata would be unfair. Under this discre-
tionary approach, the mere existence of alternative grounds for a
decision would not trigger an exception.
Consistent with the Second Restatement's treatment of discretion-
ary exceptions," 0 the losing party to the first action should come
forward with a substantive reason why res judicata should not be
applied in his case. This discretionary approach to res judicata for
106 See Lucas, supra note 82, at 723.
107 Id. at 725.
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28(5) (1980).
109 Id. § 28(5)(c).
110 For example, on the subject of exceptions to issue preclusion, the Second Restate-
ment states:
T]he policy supporting issue preclusion is not so unyielding that it must
invariably be applied, even in the face of strong competing considera-
tions. There are instances in which the interests supporting a new deter-
mination of an issue already determined outweigh the resulting burden
on the other party and on the courts. But such instances must be the rare
exception, and litigation to establish an exception in a particular case
should not be encouraged. Thus it is important to admit an exception
only when the need for a redetermination of the issue is a compelling
one.
Id. § 28 comment g.
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unappealed, independently sufficient alternative determinations en-
courages complete litigation and review by appeal in initial actions.
The discretionary approach also allows exceptions to res judicata
whenever fairness so requires.
In Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co."' these fairness considerations per-
suaded the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to deny an offensive appli-
cation of collateral estoppel to an alternative ground. An employee,
Workman, had sued Quaker Oats for failure to provide expected
retirement plan benefits;"12 he won under two theories: breach of
contract and detrimental reliance." 13 Quaker Oats did not appeal' 14
although 132 other employees had been eligible for the company's
initial retirement plan. 1 5 Subsequently, fourteen of those eligible
employees sued Quaker Oats for their benefits. 1 6 The employee
plaintiffs in Hicks prevailed on a summary judgment motion by argu-
ing that the prior decision conclusively established the existence of a
binding bilateral contract. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed. The court argued that, in the case of offensive collat-
eral estoppel, the existence of alternative determinations in the first
action increased the likelihood that a defendant lacked incentive to
appeal. According to the court, "the arguments against the 'alterna-
tive ground' rule are made more persuasive when estoppel is used
offensively. . . . [T]he traditional arguments concerning the un-
fairness of offensive collateral estoppel are bolstered when the es-
toppel used is an alternative ground."' 1 7 The Hicks court believed
that the application of offensive collateral estoppel would be unfair
because Quaker could not appeal the breach of contract ground
alone. 18
Even in the case of offensive collateral estoppel, a court should
consider the incentive to litigate fully in the first action provided by
the certain prospect of future litigation. For example, in Hicks, had
Quaker Oats been defending both actions simultaneously, the com-
pany would have been fully aware of the potential collateral effects
of the determinations against it in the suit won by Workman. Under
these circumstances, its incentive to appeal the initial action would
have been much greater. Thus, the potential estoppel effects of an
1 662 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1981).
112 Id. at 1161.
113 Id. at 1161-62.
114 Id. at 1162.
115 See id. at 1171 n.12.
116 Id. at 1159.
117 Id. at 1170.
118 An appeal of only the breach of contract issue might have been dismissed as
moot. See Lucas, supra note 82, at 728 n. 134. Lucas agrees that application of res judi-
cata in Hicks would have been unfair. Id. at 728.
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alternative determination in simultaneous litigation should provide
the requisite incentive to appeal. 119 Therefore, when a party is in-
volved in simultaneous litigations it may, on balance, be appropriate
to give offensive collateral estoppel effect to an alternative
determination. 120
CONCLUSION
Although Halpern v. Schwartz raised valid concerns about the res
judicata effect of unappealed, independently sufficient alternative
determinations, a general rule of nonpreclusion unnecessarily un-
dermines the valid objectives of res judicata. A general rule of res
judicata with discretionary exceptions would promote complete liti-
gation in the first action, yet avoid unfairness. Parties would not be
able to use alternative determinations to sidestep res judicata unless
they had a substantive reason (incomplete litigation by the parties,
inadequate reasoning by the court of first decision, or purely cau-
tionary appeal) caused by the existence of the multiple grounds.
Discretionary exceptions to preclusion adequately handle these situ-
ations. Absent these circumstances, a general preclusion rule would
promote full and fair resolution of the initial action, consistent with
the goals of res judicata.
E. William Stockmeyer
119 Cf Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 68 (2d Cir. 1978) (refusing to grant exception
to defensive collateral estoppel where plaintiff pursued two actions simultaneously and,
therefore, had sufficient incentive to appeal first action despite alternative grounds).
The court stated
[W]e see no reason to depart from [the rule that a decision based on
alternative grounds bars relitigation of any of those grounds] in an in-
stance where the plaintiff was pursuing the two actions simultaneously
and thus could fully anticipate the potential barring effect of the earlier
judgment in deciding not to appeal from [that decision].
Id. (citing Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1154 (2d Cir. 1977)).
120 In some situations future litigation of the same issues may be virtually certain,
even though separate suits are not brought concurrently. For example, in Hicks, Quaker
Oats had 132 eligible employees with potentially the same cause of action as the plain-
tiff, Workman. See supra text accompanying note 115. The Hicks court, however, did not
consider whether the virtual certainty of future litigation ameliorated any potential
unfairness.
